Open Democracy / ‘Belarus: love and paranoia’ by Natalia Leshchenko
A book on paranoia suddenly disappears. Two days after it had hit Minsk bookshops and Belarus’s internet retailers, it is suddenly “unavailable”. Neither inquiring readers nor embarrassed sales staff are given any explanation. It is as if the book never existed. But it did, and free electronic versions of the elusive novel are now spawning on the net.
Paranoia is a novel about love in time of dictatorship. The love between a man and a woman is described with freshness, subtlety, depth and joy. In the background is the dark, sinister world of authoritarian rule, with its frozen emotions, unspoken truths, and bizarre understanding of reality – so well entrenched in people’s heads that they are unsure which thoughts and fears are their own and which are implanted into their minds by overbearing power.
The book (which was published in Moscow) never mentions Belarus. The dictator is not the president but the secret-service minister, and his character is deliberately crafted to differ from the current Belarusian leader. The author opens the novel with the pointed statement: “all characters are fictional”. Yet Minsk’s landmarks are tangible in his social dystopia.
The Belarusian authorities’ nervousness is understandable on two counts. First, the political regime depicted in the novel is more melodramatic in its behaviour than the current reality (for example, the secret services kill dissenting young people rather than incarcerating them or expelling them from universities). Thus the novel runs against the message of “changing Belarus” the government is keen to present to Europe and the world beyond, to win their trust and investments. Second, the country portrayed has the atmosphere of a poignant, worried and lonely individual, far from the happy collectivist atmosphere the Belarusian authorities seek to project.
It is not the book but the ban that does the authorities a real disservice. This is a regime that became possible and sustained itself on the basis of the deft crafting of a populist national ideology. Here, the silent and unexplained prohibition of Paranoia erodes the image of trust that the government is painstakingly and at a great expense trying to disseminate.
The message of suppression is at glaring odds with the official governmental narrative. It suggests that the real things in Belarus happen in silence, unpredictably and without explanation. The government’s lack of communication in areas of international concern confirms and strengthens this adverse view.
The fear that lies behind this elusive decision by Belarusian officials is rooted in the borderless reality enabled by the internet and globalisation. True, they have banned books before. But Paranoia is the first novel that stands a chance of acquiring a large-scale international readership that they had confronted. Their awkward and clumsy treatment will, for a would-be populist regime, carry a greater cost even than its mishandling of the economy.
A double gift
Paranoia’s strongest point is the truthful, melancholy portrait of the ambiguous realities and confused attitudes of people forced to live under a watchful paternalistic state. Under communism, dissidents could pay lip-service to the political regime while secluding their own understanding of reality. Under dictatorship-induced paranoia, individual and social truths mix so well that people lose their judgment; their personal phobias are multiplied by the fears created by the secret services, so that they do not know where true reality begins and ends.
The novel articulates in a convincing and gripping way an argument rarely seen even in “political-regime” literature – that dictatorships are sustained not just by secret police and oppressive state apparatuses, but by people themselves. It demonstrates how real and perceived fears become mingled in ways that undermine individual action and judgment, and stifle liberty. It implies that regime-change begins not at the ballot-box but within a person’s own mind. This is a rare and insightful contribution that Belarusians, based on their own experience, can give to the world.
The country’s cultural products are the reflection and consequence of its social and political life. It is only logical that a Belarusian writer has published a book on life under dictatorship. The author is Viktar Martinovich, a soft-spoken, intelligent writer who now teaches in Vilnius: a man previously able to maintain the improbable position of a journalist employing a critical irony that offered no comfort but also no weapon to the authorities.
The Belarusian authorities, instead of banning the novel, missed a trick. They could have jumped on its bandwagon and celebrated the book. For the first time ever, the country has on offer a dynamic cultural product that has the chance to reach a worldwide audience. The censorship of Viktar Martinovich’s compelling prose will only fuel Paranoia’s international reputation. The authorities have transformed a piece of good literature into a political cause. Belarusians are now living with that double gift.
Russia Energy Dispute Episode 2010: Belarus and Oil
It would not be a proper New Year without signs of an energy “war” of sorts emanating from the eastward quarters. This time Russia disputes with Belarus, and over the oil, for a change. The matter is not the price itself, but the export duty. Belarus refines Russian oil at two large facilities, but exports the bulk of the produce, also charging a hefty petrochemicals export fee – which the Russian side believe is theirs. The first attempt to make Belarus itself pay Russia export, rather than domestic, was taken in January 2007, resulting in a brief halt to Russian oil supplies to Europe and a half-way tariff solution. Belarus paid US$53 per ton as export duty instead of the initial US$180, and kept 15% of the collected export duty, while Russia retained 85%. The agreement expired at the start of this year.
Now Russia is on the assault again, although this time round it has its hands tied up by its own invention, the tripartite Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan, which, as Belarusian government reasonably points out, precludes any tariff duplicity. The Belarusian side, however, is also vulnerable. According to estimations by economist Yaroslav Romantchuk, should the Russian conditions be observed, Belarus would need to pay some US$5.6 billion in 2010 in oil export duties alone, which equals over 10% of its GDP and nearly equals profits from exporting refined oil, estimated over US$6 billion. The tariff is thus effectively untenable for the Belarusian economy.
Given the high stakes for both sides, negotiations over the new oil contract may prove more difficult than either side would warrant – and take longer than the now habitual seasonal energy haggles. This is because the root cause – Russia’s subsidised energy prices remains intact in principle. To resolve this most recent impasse, Russia may be hoping to obtain control over Belarusian oil refining assets, in exchange for some lower tariffs, something that the Belarusian side will be very reluctant to part with. In any case, Belarus is likely to see conditions to worsen for the oil refining industry, which is likely to lower its share in the GPD and export in the long term. For Russia, the question is how much and who exactly will gain from the new contract: the Russian budget from the higher energy tariffs, or oil companies from being able to buy Belarusian assets on cheap. The recipients of Russian oil via Belarus in Poland and Germany can remain on quiet alert, for the attempts to cover up the dispute from both sides show that they are eager to contain the situation to themselves at least at present.
Medvedev Gives Russians a Dream; Now They Need Tools to Achieve it, too
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev made his second national address today. The first one, a year ago, shocked the foreign audience by its proposal to increase the presidential service term from four to six years, the measure put into place soon afterwards. This time round the address surprised rather the domestic than the foreign audience. Medvedev spoke of modernisation of Russia, in terms of both technological and political breakthrough, and said that for the first time ever, this will be done basing on democratic principles and values.
Medvedev’s reforms are well needed, in the political sphere as much as in the failing economy and dilapidated infrastructure. Whilst Medvedev’s reform agenda for the technological and infrastructure breakthrough is fairly sound, with regard to politics he might be catching up with what the West has already left. Medvedev’s political proposals all have to do with political party development and empowerment of legislative bodies at the regional and local levels. Yet as experience of EU democracies shows, party politics is already past its heyday, and new forms of political engagement are being searched for. Similarly, in Russia, people are concerned that their voices cannot be heard by the state, and that their real influence over political and economic decisions is minute. This became apparent during a call-in BBC Russian programme Vashe Slovo today. Although nearly 20,000 people responded to president’s call for ideas on how to move Russia forward over the last two months, many remain sceptical their proposals will ever reach the president or see the light of the day at all.
The Russian president rightly points out that the country needs ‘clever, free and responsible people’, but the party political tools are not the only remedy for the current participation ills, nor the best one. To put Russia into genuine political avant-guarde, Medvedev needs to support and bring forward institutes and mechanisms to support such active and responsible citizens, and create sustainable and trusted channels for their ideas to be swiftly and effectively put to the government and brought to life.
Путь Либерала. Делу лорда Ральфа Дарендорфа посвящается
3 ноября в Вестминстерском аббатстве отпевали лорда Ральфа Дарендорфа, великого мыслителя, известного политика, высокого чиновника, британского барона. Вернее по переводу и по сути – служили благодарственную за его жизнь и труды. Служба была легкой и светлой, и молились не за упокой души, а за продолжение дела этого человека. За свободу личности, за демократию, за истинную европейскую интеграцию. Удивительно, что речи и молитвы о демократии под строгими сводами многовекового оплота британской культуры не резали слух и звучали совершенно естественно. Потому что можно и вправду прожить жизнь как свободная личность и активный гражданин.
Жизнь Ральфа Дарендорфа – воплощение не американской, а европейской мечты. В американской человек преодолевает препятствия и достигает высот материального благополучия, и на том сказке конец. В европейской человек стремится к интеллектуальной и профессиональной свободе, к самопостижению и реализации своих идеалов – это образ жизни. Дарендорф на пути воплощения этой мечты сделал несколько блестящих карьер, каждая их которых была более чем достаточна для знаменательной жизни.
Как политик Ральф Дарендорф был членом Бундестага и в возрасте 40 лет вошел в правительство Вилли Брандта в 1969г. Оттуда он стал Комиссаром Евросоюза от Германии, заняв пост, являвшийся пределом мечтаний для чиновника того времени. Но не стал брюссельским бюрократом, а предпочел должность директора Лондонской Школы Экономики. В 1988 Дарендорф получил британское гражданство, а в 1993 «самый любимый немец в Британии после принца Альберта (мужа королевы Виктории)» стал британским пэром, получив дворянский титул вопреки сопротивлению тогдашнего премьера Тэтчер и активно участвовал в заседаниях Палаты Лордов Британии. Уникальное участие Дарендорфа в политическом процессе сразу двух европейских, однако, вторично по сравнению с его академической и интеллектуальной значимостью.
«Один из главнейших европейских мыслителей и интеллектуалов» (по словам немецкого канцлера Ангелы Меркель), Дарендорф известен прежде всего как великий ученый, выдающийся социолог, который умел понять суть происходящего с людьми и миром и объяснить это доходчиво, убедительно и интересно. Немец, глубоко переживавший за последствия нацизма, Дарендорф выявил и назвал всего четыре фактора, которые «привели к Аушвицу», сделали нацизм в Германии возможным. «Общество и политика в Германии» 1967 г – лучшая книга по истокам немецкого фашизма. Предостережение Дарендорфа: проблема Германии в том, что немцы на все ищут абсолютные ответы и сильного лидера, который воплотил бы их в реальность – крайне актуально для сегодняшней России.
Дарендорф также уточнил учение Маркса, первым показав, что в ХХ веке сила не у того, у кого деньги, а у того, у кого власть. Он говорил, что конфликт – нормальное явление, которое нужно уметь разрешать, а не избегать. «Жизнь непроста, и не должна быть проста, – писал Дарендорф. – Сложности делают ее богаче. Давайте научимся с этим жить». Демократия – способ жить с конфликтом. Что значит не подавлять личности и события, а находить позитивные пути их реализации в существующем контексте. Только так конфликты будут способствовать развитию общества.
В этом фундаментальный принцип учения и жизни Дарендорфа – человек должен быть личностью и активным гражданином, а государство – создавать условия для развития и свободы индивидуума, чтобы граждане сами совершенствовали свое общество. Он был либералом, по духу и по сути, и показывал это личным примером.
Дарендорф искал свой собственный ответ и составлял свое мнение, а не заимствовал шаблоны. Противостоять «закрытому, всеохватывающему» режимы он начал еще подростком. В 15 лет, не будучи евреем, Дарендорф попал в польский концлагерь за распространение анти-нацистских листовок.
Его отец был активным социал-демократом– но сам он не пошел уже в чем-то готовой отцовской дорогой, так как считал, что распределительный подход социал-демократов превращает людей в иждивенцев – и выбрал в политике и жизни ту, которая больше соответствовала его убеждениям. Дарендорф выделялся среди академиков тем, что не возделывал, как подавляющее большинство, одну и ту же ниву, но прилагал свой могучий интеллект к разнообразным проблемам и вопросам. Он писал свои научные труды стилем, который легко понять и интересно читать и не ученым, не поддаваясь жесткой моде уподоблять социологические тексты инженерным чертежам. Он не смотрел на мир с высокой башни академии, но активно участвовал в его совершенствовании как политик и общественный деятель. Более того, он связывал с обществом целый институт – Лондонскую Школу Экономики и Политических Наук (LSE), способствуя общению ее студентов и преподавателей с политиками и чиновниками разных стран и продвигая талантливых студентов в «реальный мир». При этом Дарендорф уважал и не забывал себя самого: создал большую семью, вырастил и воспитал детей, получал удовольствие от жизни, любил шампанское и джаз и всегда хорошо выглядел.
Как многие великие люди, Дарендорф в чем-то опередил свое время. Вторая половина ХХ века была эпохой прагматично действующих технократов, а не неординарно мыслящих романтиков. Нынешнее время также сложно назвать веком романтизма, но когда рациональные планы и принципы устройства рухнули в глобальном масштабе, настало время поиска идей и появилась потребность в свободных и активных людях. В постсоветском контексте, в нынешней России, где слово «демократия» используется с фальшивым или уничижительным оттенком, а «свобода личности» является понятием теоретическим, такая потребность одновременно и особенно ясна, и трудна в воплощении. Можно – и справедливо – кивать на довлеющее государство и запутанный политический режим. А можно стараться их активно изменить, не становясь при этом радикалом и отщепенцем, и при этом не только не забыть себя, но и сделать свою жизнь ярче и значительнее. Находить свои собственные ответы и воплощать их в реальность – не только мечта. Лорд и профессор Ральф Дарендорф показал, что это может быть путь реальной жизни.
Жизни либерала.
Наталья Лещенко, INSTID
Автор – докторский стипендиат Лорда Дарендорфа в Лондонской школе экономики
A Tribute to Lord Ralf Dahrendorf
A thanksgiving service was held today at St. Margaret church in Westminster Abbey for the life and work of Ralf Dahrendorf, a foremost sociologists and parliamentarian. I was fortunate to be his scholar at the London School of Economics. LSE boasts many peers among its professors but none of the rather many “academic lords” I met during my studies there stroke a comparable figure of intellectual and personal magnitude and formidability. For a young PhD student, talking to Dahrendorf was like conversing with a pure intellect itself.
“Are you writing a book at the moment?”, asked my fellow scholar Ebenezer Obadare during our first meeting with Dahrendorf. “Am I writing a book?- he seemed bemused. – I am always writing a book”.
I discovered Dahrendorf’s books before I met him, surprised how easily they read. They were texts, fine impeccable stories which helped make sense of the world and its past and present – like the book explaining origins of Nazism in Germany or a later one talking of the modern social conflict. There, I was amazed to find the suggestion that for young people to advance themselves and the society most, they should be having fun with what they do. What a far cry from statistics-crammed today’s sociological books, geared to descriptory tables and graphs. “Sociologist nowadays try to prove they are not worse than engineers” – Dahrendorf joked to us.When I came back from my own fieldwork with insane amounts of data, he said, “I hope you will be able to make some sense out of what you’ve met rather than reporting that 30% of your subjects think one way and 15% another”. This was to a great relief, for it seemed he justified and encouraged my inclination to avoid numbers and produce ideas instead.
Dahrendorf himself of course needed no endorsement – he was known to speak his truth whatever the context – and believed this was everyone’s right, too. At the time of technocrats, he was not afraid to draw on “irrational” as possible or partial explanations for the phenomena he studied, and say that out loud, too. He spoke for liberty and, in particular, the liberty of the individual – to grow, to develop, and to make a sincere and committed contribution to the society. He spoke against the big state, and for the parliamentary chamber full of responsible individuals free from constraints of party politics. An often lone voice in his lifetime, Dahrendorf’s ideas are gaining wider momentum. The “democracy of numbers” is giving way to “democracy of ideas”, faceless masses are yielding to active individuals that have ideas and agenda, and democracy again has a chance to be redefined in a way that takes it back closer to individual-focused liberty rather than egalitarian socialism.
Like many people for certain, I like to think that Ralf Dahrendorf was my mentor. We did not meet often, but he gave me guidance with my thesis, encouraged my quest into “irrational” within political sociology framework, provided recommendations for funding applications, and most crucially, supported my inkling to get out of the academia; the phrase “you want to be more than a senior lecturer at a Warwick university” inspired more than just me to look outside the “white tower” of universities and embrace the world. Today at the service, he inspired me again. Doing CIS politics, it was a first time in several years that I heard the word “democracy” being used not with a pejorative tint, but with respect and care, as a worthy goal of a society – and a person. Lord Dahrendorf enjoyed and savoured his life, while also enlightening millions through his outstanding books and helping thousands personally. A truly great man, a fully worthy life. A genuine inspiration.
Natalia Leshchenko
Miliband’s Visit to Russia furthers relations with the EU rather than Britain
David Miliband’s visit to Moscow has had only symbolic significance for the bilateral relations, leaving all the sore issues effectively intact. Agreements on multilateral problems such as Iran’s nuclear programme, Afghanistan and Middle East settlement, and nuclear disarmament, are important but can hardly make headlines. At present, there is no obvious need for either government to demonstrate political will and make sacrifices for rapid rapproachment. (Unlike in US-Russia relations where new presidents on both sides needed to mark a clear departure from their predecessors, resulting in nuclear détente).
The visit is best understood if seen not as a purely Russo-British affair, but rather a development in Russia-EU partnership. David Miliband is currently being slated for EU’s foreign policy chief position. His increased rapport with Russia could strengthen his personal professional credentials, to balance the already effective ties with the U.S. - to the benefit Europe’s foreign relations. Indeed, the most notable development of the visit so far is Miliband’s cautious support for considering Russia’s initiative of a new security framework for Europe, something that has fallen on deaf ears with Europe so far. The progress on EU-Russia security dialogue is an unexpected – but nonetheless significant outcome of Miliband’s trip to Moscow.
Is Medvedev Mr Russia?
Russian president Dmitry Medvedev is travelling to Switzerland and the US this week to take part in G20 meeting and also continue talks with President Barak Obama.
As Dmitry Medvedev travels to Switzerland this week and later to the US to face president Obama and mingle with other G20 leaders, the overwhelming question will remain: Is this the man to talk to on Russia? After all, many in the West strongly believe Russia is still run by Vladimir Putin, who also recently blatantly said the country’s leadership since 2012 will be decided in a “chat” between himself and Medvedev, the president echoing that they are “of the same blood”.
Over the 15 months of his presidency in Russia, Medvedev has achieved more than anyone expected: he is re-ploughing the legislative field, to create foundations of a legal state in Russia, and uproot corruption. He has started improving the state bureaucracy, and has held a helping hand to small businesses and civil society in Russia. Some diplomatic successes, including the rapproachment with the US, are also said to be under his personal belt. Last week, Medvedev published a clever, insightful, comprehensible and inspiring programme “Russia, forward”, outlining the major priorities for the country’s development to do away with Russia’s inherent sluggishness and achieve a technological break-through while also fostering individuals’ sense of self-worth. Such a combination is unprecedented in Russia, the two previous economic modernisations (under Stalin and Tsar Peter I) were achieved at a massive social cost.
Despite all that work, and also efforts to reach out to the Russian public via a personal video blog and regular TV interviews, there is something seriously missing about Medvedev that so far keeps him in the shadow of Putin. He might be the right and likeable guy for an ordinary Russian, but he does not appear to be capable enough as a national leader. Medvedev’s achievements are not celebrated, they are almost clandestine, not to undermine Putin. He is less known as an individual than Putin. Most importantly, he lacks a supporting structure: the main problem with his call to Russians to join him in taking “Russia forward” is that it has zero suggestions as to how those who share his views can contribute.
Medvedev does some profound work and takes little credit for it. He might rather do, but Putin’s people are omnipresent even in his own administration, and he personally is no fan of radical moves. No need for a revolution, though. What Medvedev has to do is not to copy Putin’s brusque style, but rise to show he is a different, but equally strong, personality. This will help him get a following and resources eventually needed to realise his liberal vision for Russia. As he goes on the foreign tour, he will be sharing this vision with foreign leaders and the public. The more they treat him as Mr Russia, the more chances are he will succeed in realising it.
Russia Shows Maturity with Cautious Welcome of U.S. Defence Shield U-turn
Today’s breakthrough announcement about the reversal of U.S. plans to build nuclear defence shield is certainly music to the Kremlin’s ears. The Russian leadership has made its objection to the shield very clear over the recent years, so that the critics of Obama’s policy change immediately interpreted his move as “bowing to Russian pressure”. The White House has specifically denied this, and the Kremlin – so far – has been wise enough not to embarrass its partner by making claims to have “prevailed” over the U.S. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov merely remarked that Obama’s decision “rectifies mistakes of the Bush administration”. If the official Russia keeps to this line and resists the temptation to have held sway over the U.S., further progress in bilateral relations and cooperation on topics such as nuclear and European security, can be expected.
Natalia Leshchenko, PhD Senior Expert Institute for State Ideologies (INSTID)




