Belarus Stands to Gain from Dispute with Russia
First, this is the first genuine case of Russia yielding gas deliveries as a policy tool in relations with neighbouring states. The earlier cases were directly linked to the signing of new contracts and price bargaining, whereas the current sending of the gas debt bill is hardly disguised by the Kremlin itself as a way of making Belarus toe the line on the tripartite Customs Union with Kazakhstan. The Belarusian government argues that the current Customs Union charter favour Russian producers and seeks equal rights for the Belarusian companies, thus halting the kick-off of Moscow’s most ambitious economic project to date.
Second, Belarus is taking a new stance. Instead of being a victim of Russia’s energy cut, the government has stood up to the Kremlin’s act and produced their own bill to Russia, for gas transit to Europe, and also stood by it, cutting deliveries to Europe. Such a challenge of Moscow on equal terms may bounce back for Belarus in unsubsidised energy prices. Yet, the military and other assets of Belarus that are of interest to Russia will continue giving Minsk a fair bargaining position vis-à-vis Moscow.
As regards relations with the EU, Belarus is taking a big gamble. Whilst being the very country to cut gas deliveries, they try to pass the blame on Moscow and offer cooperation in other areas as a symbol of departing from Russia’s orbit. The EU, however, prefers to stay out of the debate to the largest possible degree.
Finally, Belarusian president Lukashenka is handling the crisis in a way that should help his re-election in February 2011. The conflict context is perfect for him to revoke his image of the saviour and defender of the Belarusian nation, which he .does with regard to securing the rights of the producers within the Customs Union and demanding transit payments for gas.
The whole conflict puts Belarus again on the news map which is ultimately useful for the country.
ChasKor.ru / Наталья Лещенко: Отдать всё (Владимир Потанин имеет шанс изменить отношение русских к деньгам)
пятница, 5 февраля 2010 года, 09.38
Наталья Лещенко, Институт государственных идеологий (INSTID) Отдать всё
Владимир Потанин имеет шанс изменить отношение русских к деньгам
В интервью Financial Times Владимир Потанин сказал, что отдаст всё своё состояние на благотворительные цели в течение ближайших 10 лет. На родине его заявление осталось в тени репортажей о принятии президентом Медведевым комплекса мер по улучшению инвестиционного климата в России. Между тем с точки зрения репутации страны за рубежом и общественного развития самой России заявление Потанина было крайне знаменательным. Статья в ChasKor полностью Read more
Russia Energy Dispute Episode 2010: Belarus and Oil
It would not be a proper New Year without signs of an energy “war” of sorts emanating from the eastward quarters. This time Russia disputes with Belarus, and over the oil, for a change. The matter is not the price itself, but the export duty.
Russia Energy Dispute Episode 2010: Belarus and Oil
It would not be a proper New Year without signs of an energy “war” of sorts emanating from the eastward quarters. This time Russia disputes with Belarus, and over the oil, for a change. The matter is not the price itself, but the export duty. Belarus refines Russian oil at two large facilities, but exports the bulk of the produce, also charging a hefty petrochemicals export fee – which the Russian side believe is theirs. The first attempt to make Belarus itself pay Russia export, rather than domestic, was taken in January 2007, resulting in a brief halt to Russian oil supplies to Europe and a half-way tariff solution. Belarus paid US$53 per ton as export duty instead of the initial US$180, and kept 15% of the collected export duty, while Russia retained 85%. The agreement expired at the start of this year.
Now Russia is on the assault again, although this time round it has its hands tied up by its own invention, the tripartite Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan, which, as Belarusian government reasonably points out, precludes any tariff duplicity. The Belarusian side, however, is also vulnerable. According to estimations by economist Yaroslav Romantchuk, should the Russian conditions be observed, Belarus would need to pay some US$5.6 billion in 2010 in oil export duties alone, which equals over 10% of its GDP and nearly equals profits from exporting refined oil, estimated over US$6 billion. The tariff is thus effectively untenable for the Belarusian economy.
Given the high stakes for both sides, negotiations over the new oil contract may prove more difficult than either side would warrant – and take longer than the now habitual seasonal energy haggles. This is because the root cause – Russia’s subsidised energy prices remains intact in principle. To resolve this most recent impasse, Russia may be hoping to obtain control over Belarusian oil refining assets, in exchange for some lower tariffs, something that the Belarusian side will be very reluctant to part with. In any case, Belarus is likely to see conditions to worsen for the oil refining industry, which is likely to lower its share in the GPD and export in the long term. For Russia, the question is how much and who exactly will gain from the new contract: the Russian budget from the higher energy tariffs, or oil companies from being able to buy Belarusian assets on cheap. The recipients of Russian oil via Belarus in Poland and Germany can remain on quiet alert, for the attempts to cover up the dispute from both sides show that they are eager to contain the situation to themselves at least at present.
День России в Лондонской Школе Экономики
19-20 марта 2010 года под эгидой Лондонской школы экономики (LSE) будет проводиться мероприятие «День России» и ежегодная конференция «Неделя российского бизнеса 2010». Организаторы – Институт государственных идеологий (INSTID) и Русское студенческое бизнес общество в Британии.
Цели мероприятия «День России» – повысить внимание к России среди мировой управленческой элиты следующего поколения. В частности:
• поднять интерес и разъяснить позицию России по наиболее острым вопросам отношений Россия-ЕС: предложения новой системы европейской безопасности, планов строительства новых газопроводов в ЕС
• создать положительную эмоциональную связь с Россией у людей, обычно не интересующихся российской проблематикой. Read more
Medvedev Gives Russians a Dream; Now They Need Tools to Achieve it, too
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev made his second national address today. The first one, a year ago, shocked the foreign audience by its proposal to increase the presidential service term from four to six years, the measure put into place soon afterwards. This time round the address surprised rather the domestic than the foreign audience. Medvedev spoke of modernisation of Russia, in terms of both technological and political breakthrough, and said that for the first time ever, this will be done basing on democratic principles and values.
Medvedev’s reforms are well needed, in the political sphere as much as in the failing economy and dilapidated infrastructure. Whilst Medvedev’s reform agenda for the technological and infrastructure breakthrough is fairly sound, with regard to politics he might be catching up with what the West has already left. Medvedev’s political proposals all have to do with political party development and empowerment of legislative bodies at the regional and local levels. Yet as experience of EU democracies shows, party politics is already past its heyday, and new forms of political engagement are being searched for. Similarly, in Russia, people are concerned that their voices cannot be heard by the state, and that their real influence over political and economic decisions is minute. This became apparent during a call-in BBC Russian programme Vashe Slovo today. Although nearly 20,000 people responded to president’s call for ideas on how to move Russia forward over the last two months, many remain sceptical their proposals will ever reach the president or see the light of the day at all.
The Russian president rightly points out that the country needs ‘clever, free and responsible people’, but the party political tools are not the only remedy for the current participation ills, nor the best one. To put Russia into genuine political avant-guarde, Medvedev needs to support and bring forward institutes and mechanisms to support such active and responsible citizens, and create sustainable and trusted channels for their ideas to be swiftly and effectively put to the government and brought to life.
Медведев выступил с Посланием Федеральному Собранию РФ
Оригинальный текст на kommentarii.ru
Медведев дал россиянам мечту; теперь им нужны политические инструменты.
В своем обращении президент Медведев сделал шаг вперед от традиционных «распределительно-обещательных» текстов этого жанра, привычных для жителей стран СНГ. Его послание более напоминало программные речи политиков западных демократий, признанные обозначить большие цели и вдохновить избирателей на их исполнение.
Реформатору Медведеву крайне необходима народная поддержка для реализации своего видения России. Она нужна не только для преодоления инерции и сопротивления бюрократического аппарата. Его мечта о стране «умных, свободных и ответственных» людей невозможна без их взращивания и без создания механизмов их взаимодействия с властью. В этом программа президента пока недостаточна.
Медведев предлагает усиление местных органов власти и партийное строительство – а в развитых демократиях оба механизма, особенно партийная политика, уже изжили себя и не соответствуют потребностям эклектичного неклассового пост-индустриального общества. Поэтому в то время как заимствовать опыт ведущих стран в области инфраструктуры и технологий разумно, для глубокой политической «перестройки» усиление традиционных механизмов представительной демократии неэффективно. Укреплять политические механизмы прошлого для России недостаточно.
Чтобы быть настоящим мировым лидером, России можно и нужно принести в жизнь новые политические инструменты. В частности, можно сказать новое слово в отношении института гражданского общества: создать более прямые, чем представительные, механизмы для поощрения политической и социальной деятельности активных граждан и реализации их идей. Бюрократический аппарат в законодательных и исполнительных ветвях власти для этого некомпетентен, инертен, и главное, не заинтересован. Нужны новые каналы, которые пользовались бы доверием тех самых людей, которые так важны для Медведева, и которым бы также и доверяло государство.
Президентское послание – смелый и нужный шаг. Чтобы сделать другие, и не в одиночку, президенту нужно дать возможности активным гражданам стать рядом с собой.
Miliband’s Visit to Russia furthers relations with the EU rather than Britain
David Miliband’s visit to Moscow has had only symbolic significance for the bilateral relations, leaving all the sore issues effectively intact. Agreements on multilateral problems such as Iran’s nuclear programme, Afghanistan and Middle East settlement, and nuclear disarmament, are important but can hardly make headlines. At present, there is no obvious need for either government to demonstrate political will and make sacrifices for rapid rapproachment. (Unlike in US-Russia relations where new presidents on both sides needed to mark a clear departure from their predecessors, resulting in nuclear détente).
The visit is best understood if seen not as a purely Russo-British affair, but rather a development in Russia-EU partnership. David Miliband is currently being slated for EU’s foreign policy chief position. His increased rapport with Russia could strengthen his personal professional credentials, to balance the already effective ties with the U.S. - to the benefit Europe’s foreign relations. Indeed, the most notable development of the visit so far is Miliband’s cautious support for considering Russia’s initiative of a new security framework for Europe, something that has fallen on deaf ears with Europe so far. The progress on EU-Russia security dialogue is an unexpected – but nonetheless significant outcome of Miliband’s trip to Moscow.
Miliband’s Visit to Russia furthers relations with the EU rather than Britain
David Miliband’s visit to Moscow has had only symbolic significance for the bilateral relations, leaving all the sore issues effectively intact. Agreements on multilateral problems such as Iran’s nuclear programme, Afghanistan and Middle East settlement, and nuclear disarmament, are important but can hardly make headlines. At present, there is no obvious need for either government to demonstrate political will and make sacrifices for rapid rapproachment. (Unlike in US-Russia relations where new presidents on both sides needed to mark a clear departure from their predecessors, resulting in nuclear détente).
The visit is best understood if seen not as a purely Russo-British affair, but rather a development in Russia-EU partnership. David Miliband is currently being slated for EU’s foreign policy chief position. His increased rapport with Russia could strengthen his personal professional credentials, to balance the already effective ties with the U.S. - to the benefit Europe’s foreign relations. Indeed, the most notable development of the visit so far is Miliband’s cautious support for considering Russia’s initiative of a new security framework for Europe, something that has fallen on deaf ears with Europe so far. The progress on EU-Russia security dialogue is an unexpected – but nonetheless significant outcome of Miliband’s trip to Moscow.
“No Win” EU report on Georgia-Russia War
The report by an independent commission under the EU aegis published today exonerates Russia of starting the military conflict but supports territorial integrity of Georgia. Establishing the truth is an ungrateful job, especially with regard to an armed conflict. Report’s findings exonerate both conflicting sides in some aspects while also giving each a share of blame. Such a two-way conclusion is plausible and credible, meaning that the report’s findings can form a solid basis for international consensus over the August 2008 conflict and policy decisions with its regard.
Russia celebrates the finding blaming the start of hostilities on Georgia, but will downplay the report’s conclusion that the separatist republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia cannot be recognised based on Kosovo precedent due to the absence of established genocide of their population by Georgian authorities. The Kremlin will not change its position on the status of the republics. Realising that the push for the recognition of the republics will only build up this pressure point in relations with Europe and the U.S., Moscow may prefer to put the issue to the back burner for the time being.